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Abstract
This paper explores the interplay between past exposure to macroeconomic shocks and pop-
ulist attitudes. We document that individuals who experienced a macroeconomic shock
during their impressionable years (between 18 and 25 years of age), are currently more prone
to voting for populist parties, and manifest lower trust both in national and European in-
stitutions. We use data from the European Social Survey (ESS) to construct the differential
individual exposure to macroeconomic shocks during those years. Our findings suggest that
it is not only exposure to current economic shocks that matters (see e.g., Guiso et al. (2020))
but also past exposure to economic recessions, which has a persistent effect on the rise of
populism. Analytically, past economic shocks are associated with a fall in trust in national
and European institutions and a rise in anti-immigrant attitudes. Interestingly, the interplay
between the two, i.e., past and current exposure to economic shocks, has a mitigating effect
on the rise of populism, meaning that individuals who were exposed to economic shocks in
the past are less likely to manifest populist attitudes when faced with a current crisis.
Keywords: Macroeconomic Shocks, Trust, Attitudes, Populism
JEL Codes: D72, E60, F68, P16, Z13
∗Corresponding Author: Anastasia Litina: University of Macedonia, Greece, anastasia.litina@uom.edu.gr; De-
spina Gavresi: University of Ioannina, Greece, degavresi@gmail.com.
1
1 Introduction
In recent years, European countries have seen an unprecedented demand for populism as a result
of the economic crisis that hit Europe and the world. The aftermath of the crisis found Europe
with a number of new and existing populist parties succeeding to enter national parliaments.
A vast literature, initially from the domains of political science and sociology attempted to
explain the origins of populism. Recently an emerging strand of the literature in economics has
theoretically discussed and empirically established the economic drivers of populism. Our paper
contributes to this literature by arguing that it is not only current socioeconomic conditions and
recent shocks that drive populist attitudes, but also past experiences.
The rise of populism in Europe is a major concern for a number of reasons. The EU is a
historically unprecedented supranational unification project (Spolaore, 2013). It has been quite
successful in both preserving political peace in Europe and in integrating into the European
democratic model the “periphery” countries of Southern and Eastern Europe (Gill and Raiser,
2012). Nevertheless, as suggested in Algan et al. (2017) many Europeans appear dissatisfied with
local and EU politicians and institutions. They study the implications of the Great Recession for
voting for populist parties, as well as for general trust and political attitudes, using regional data
across Europe. They find the existence of a strong interplay between increases in unemployment
and voting for populism as well as between the increases in unemployment and a decline in
trust in national and European political institutions. Likewise, Dustmann et al. (2017) report
similar results showing that after the crisis mistrust of European institutions, largely explained by
the poorer economic conditions of the Euro-area countries, is correlated with voting for populist
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parties. In a similar spirit, Acemoglu et al. (2013), Rodrik (2018) and Di Tella and Rotemberg
(2018), as well as Guiso et al. (2020) provide a general discussion of the recent rise of populist
parties and try to interpret that increase in the light of economic theory. Guiso et al. (2020) study
the demand and supply of populism both empirically and theoretically. They document a link
between individual-level economic insecurity and distrust in political parties, voting for populist
parties, low electoral participation and attitudes towards immigrants. Economic insecurity is
measured by individual unemployment, income difficulties that individuals face and the exposure
to a more globalized environment in their workplace. In a recent exhaustive overview, Guriev and
Papaioannou (2020) analysed the political economy of populism.
We use as a starting point the analysis in Guiso et al. (2020) to shed light to an additional
dimension of the implications of economic shocks on populist attitudes, i.e., the impact of the
impressionable exposure to economic shocks (Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2014). In our analysis, on
top of accounting for current exposure to economic shocks, we explore the effect of macroeconomic
shocks during the critical years of early adulthood (the so-called impressionable years) on voting
for populist parties, low participation in national elections, mistrust in political institutions and
negative attitudes towards immigrants. As a macroeconomic shock we define the GDP per capita
growth rate equal or lower than -3.4%. 1 This threshold represents the lowest 10th percentile of
the GDP per capita growth distribution for all countries from 1960 to 2020.
Analytically, we use data from the eight waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) and we
associate each individual to his/her past exposure to economic shocks during their impressionable
1Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014) choose the lowest 10th percentile (-3.4%) rather than simply negative GDP
growth because 80% of the individuals experienced at least one year of negative growth during their critical age
period in their sample when using this definition. They also illustrate that individuals who experienced a recession
when young believe that success in life depends more on luck than effort, support more government redistribution,
and tend to vote for left-wing parties. The effect of recessions on beliefs is long-lasting.
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years. The impressionable years hypothesis supports that core attitudes, beliefs, and values are
crystallised during a period of great mental plasticity in early adulthood (between 18 and 25
years of age) and remain largely unchanged thereafter (Krosnick and Alwin, 1989). As additional
controls we include the individual current shocks as in Guiso et al. (2020), a set of individual
controls, and a wide set of fixed effects such as wave, country, age and cohort fixed effects and in
a more demanding specification we use as well country × age fixed effects, thereby capturing a
wide set of unobservables and comparing same age individuals across different countries.
Our findings suggest that both current and impressionable exposure to shocks matters for
the formation of populist attitudes. A 1 standard deviation increase in exposure to economic
shocks between the age range 18 and 25 (impressionable years hypothesis) is associated with a
0.026 standard deviations decrease in the probability for voting for populist parties and around a
0.05 decrease in trust in political parties, national parliament, EU, politicians and satisfaction with
government. Additionally, impressionable exposure to macroeconomic shocks gives rise to negative
attitudes towards immigrants coming from countries outside EU, having different ethnicity and
the beliefs that immigrants worsen the host countries. Our findings remain significant and robust
as we shift our analysis to other age ranges between 18 and 33 years combining the impressionable
years hypothesis with the increasing persistence hypothesis (Sears, 1983).
Interestingly, we find that when we interact both past and current exposure to economic
shocks, the two experiences mitigate each other’s effect. Meaning that an individual who is
currently exposed to an economic shock, is less likely to manifest populist attitudes if he/she was
exposed to economic shocks in the past. This suggests that individuals have already carved their
personality through exposure to past shocks and are thus less vulnerable to the current economic
conditions. Our paper thus contributes to previous research by uncovering the importance of
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the past experiences and the interplay between present and the past economic experiences. This
approach improves our understanding as to why people from different countries, with similar
otherwise economic profile, respond differently to modern-day economic challenges. Our findings
shed light to the fact that history matters in shaping modern day populist attitudes.
The structure of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the data and the
empirical strategy. Section 3 presents the benchmark results. Section 4 conducts robustness
checks. Section 5 lays out the discussion, whereas Section 6 concludes.
2 Data and Empirical Strategy
2.1 Data
The analysis employs data from eight waves of the European Social Survey (2002-2016), a repeated
cross section survey that quantifies the attitudes, beliefs and behavioral patterns of citizens in 34
European countries. The sample comprises individuals from Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Finland, France, Greece, Hun-
gary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Kosovo, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Russia, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, United King-
dom and Ukraine. The ESS contains a rich set of questions that capture populist attitudes as
well as personal characteristics such as country and year of birth, gender, age, education, political
orientation, employment status, etc.
In the benchmark analysis we employ three proxies for populist attitudes as in Guiso et al.
(2020). These are i) voting behavior; ii) aspects of trust; and iii) immigrant-related attitudes.
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For voting behavior, the ESS provides us with information on whether people participated in the
last national elections and which party they voted for, thus we construct a dummy that takes the
value 1 if the individual voted for a populist party and 0 otherwise. Concerning trust, we use
variables for trust in i) parties; ii) country’s parliament; iii) politicians; and iv) European Union,
all measured on a scale between 0 (no trust) and 10 (full trust) and a proxy for satisfaction with
national government, taking the values 0 (extreme dissatisfaction) and 10 (extreme satisfaction).
Last, we capture attitudes towards i) immigrants from non-European countries, ii) immigrants
having the same or different race/ethnicity; and iii) whether people believe that immigrants make
host country worse or not.
The key explanatory variable that we construct is past exposure to macroeconomic shocks,
during the impressionable years of an individual (aged 18-25). We define a macroeconomic shock
relying on the theoretical background of economic shocks by Barro and Ursúa (2008). To this end
we extract data from the World Bank Indicators (WBI) for annual estimates of GDP per capita
growth rate since 1960. For our explanatory variable, we construct a variable equal to 1 if the
individual experienced a recession in which the GDP per capita growth was either equal or lower
than -3.4% during his or her “impressionable years” and 0 otherwise. Following the rational in
Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014) we choose this threshold as it is the lowest 10th percentile of the
GDP per capita growth distribution for all countries from 1960 to 2020. As we are restricted by
the 1960 limit, our analysis excludes those individuals who were older than 25 in the year 1960.
Last, as we compare different age intervals concerning the exposure to shocks, we use the mean
value of exposure to shocks for each period, i.e., we weight our variable by the range of years that
is relevant for each range and each individual (18-25 and 18-33).
To capture the current exposure on economic shocks we use the measures of Guiso et al. (2020),
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i.e., variables that measure individual and rather recent economic insecurity. Analytically these
are: i)whether the voter was unemployed at some time in the past five years searching for a job;
ii) whether the individual has experienced any income difficulties, e.g., whether the voter lives
comfortably with the present income or finds it difficult and last; and iii) whether the voter is
exposed to globalization or he is working as a low-skill worker in the manufacturing.
Additionally, we control for the full set of individual characteristics as in Guiso et al. (2020),
i.e., the number of years completed in full time education, time spent watching TV, total hours
spent watching news or programs about politics, gender, political orientation measured on a scale
between 0 (far left) and 10 (far right) and risk aversion using the ESS risk indicator on whether
people avoid taking risks or are prone to take any risk seeking for new adventures, considering the
hypothesis that voting for a populist party may hide some risk, therefore it appeals to more risky
people.
To identify the populist parties of each country we rely on Rooduijn et al. (2019), a list that
contains the populist parties in Europe with higher than 2% of the vote in at least one national
parliamentary election since 1998. This list identifies 82 populist parties in 28 of the 31 countries
examined. To define a party as a populist we rely on Mudde (2004) definition “parties that endorse
the set of ideas that society is ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups,
the pure people versus the corrupt elite, and which argues that politics should be an expression
of the general will of the people. Populism is about the pure people’s moral superiority over the
elites and, therefore, people’s moral right to govern”. According to Bonikowski (2017) populism is
not an ideology, but a theory of society.
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2.2 Empirical Strategy
We apply an OLS (for ease of interpretation) regression model to examine the effect of exposure to
macroeconomic shocks through the “impressionable years” on participation and voting a populist
party and as well as on interpersonal political trust and beliefs towards immigrants, dropping first
generation immigrants. Thus, we estimate the following model:
yict = a0 + α1MacroShocki + α2Xi + βa + γc + δt + θj + γc × age + ǫict, (1)
where yict denotes the political beliefs, attitudes and vote for a populist party of individual i,
in country c, participating at ESS round t, MacroShocki is individual’s i exposure to a recession
during the impressionable years. Xi is the vector of controls described above, βa, γc, δt and θj
are the age, country, wave and cohort (individuals are grouped into ten 7-year age cohorts) fixed
effects respectively, while γc × age denotes country-age fixed effects. The standard errors are
robust and clustered at the country level controlling for i) participation in voting and ii) vote for
a populist party. However, controlling for all the other variables about trust and immigration
attitudes, standard errors are clustered at cohorts level following Guiso et al. (2020).2
The inclusion of country, cohort, age and wave fixed effects implies that we are always com-
paring a particular age group to individuals from the same age group in other countries with
other experiences of recessions, to other age groups from the same country, as the experience of
economic disasters changes over time. Additionally, including the most demanding specification
i.e, γc × age fixed effects, we remove the source of variation coming from comparison to other age
2Our results are similar when we cluster at the country level as in the former analysis.
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groups from the same country and the same age group from other countries, focusing on a given
age group’s changes in voting for populism, trusting the political institutions and being exposed
to several macroeconomic shocks.
3 Empirical Findings
To assess the magnitude of our results we calculate the beta coefficients which are reported in On-
line Appendix Supplementary Tables. Table 1 documents the results for the case of an individual
participating in the last national elections and voting for a populist party. In Columns 1 and 2
we include the full set of the individual controls and fixed effects and we employ the sample of
countries that have at least one populist party. Our findings suggest that individuals who experi-
enced more macroeconomic shocks during their impressionable years prefer not to participate in
voting. When they do so however, they are more likely to vote for a populist party. A 1 standard
deviation increase in our shock is associated with a decline of 0.002 standard deviation of having
voted in the last national elections and with a 0.026 standard deviation rise in voting for a populist
party. Our results are significant at the 10% level.
Beyond our main explanatory variables, the individual economic shocks (unemployment, in-
come difficulties and exposure to globalization) are in line with Guiso et al. (2020).
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
Table 2 reports the results for trust in i) parties, ii) politicians, iii) parliament, iv) European
Union and v) government satisfaction, and as well as attitudes towards immigrants (having the
same or different ethnicity; how the immigrants affect the host country). In all columns (1-9)
we include the full set of individual controls and fixed effects. Following Guiso et al. (2020) we
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use the whole sample of countries. As a control of economic insecurity we create a composite
economic insecurity index using a principal component analysis of the three distinct variables
(unemployment, income difficulties and exposure to globalization). The results of the table suggest
that individuals who experienced more shocks during their impressionable years tend to mistrust
even more parties, politicians, parliament, EU institutions and feel dissatisfied from the national
government. More specifically, a 1 standard deviation increase in the shock variable is associated
with a 0.056 standard deviations decline in trust in political parties, 0.050 standard deviations
decline in trust in politicians, 0.063 standard deviations decline in trust in the parliament and
0.044 standard deviations decrease in government’s satisfaction. The results are significant at 1%
level. Similarly, higher exposure to a shock (1 standard deviation increase) is associated with a
decline of 0.015 standard deviations of trust in EU parliament.
Concerning immigrants, more exposure to macroeconomic shocks in early age triggers more
negative attitudes towards immigrants coming from countries outside EU, having different ethnic-
ity and it establishes rise to the belief that immigrants make the host countries worse.
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
4 Robustness Exercises
In the benchmark analysis we focus on the “impressionable years” hypothesis which is defined
between 18 and 25 years of age, playing an important role on the formation of beliefs and atti-
tudes. However, as individuals grow older, economic shocks may directly affect their working and
economic life. In this section, we test whether the individuals who experienced a macroeconomic
shock during different range of years, also manifest populist attitudes. The first range we test
10
is between 26 and 33 years of age which is often cited as the increasing persistence hypothesis.
We thus combine the two hypotheses and expand the age range from 18 to 33 years. According
to Sears (1983) the combination of persistence and impressionable years viewpoint can shape the
basic political attitudes over the lifespan.
Table 1 documents the results relating to voting. Columns 3 and 4 replicate the analysis of
Columns 1 and 2, using the measure of a shock experience during their 18 and 33 years. The
results are qualitatively similar, yet the magnitude is higher, reflecting the fact that within a
larger span, an individual is likely to experience more shocks.
Table 3 reports the results for aspects political trust, government satisfaction and the attitudes
towards immigrants. The table replicates the analysis in 1 using the full set of controls and the
exposure to shocks during the ages 18 to 33 as the main explanatory variable. As for the case of
vote, the results are qualitatively similar and quantitatively stronger.
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
Last, in Table 4 we replicate the benchmark analysis, i.e., the impact of a macroeconomic
disaster that the individuals have experienced during their impressionable years (18-25) on the
shaping of trust in political system and the attitudes about immigrants, when restricting our sam-
ple to countries which have at least one populist party. In most cases are results are quite similar,
though the results related to immigrant attitudes are somewhat weaker and remain significant at
the 10% level.
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
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5 Discussion
Our paper has built on the existing literature that highlights the role of economic shocks on
populist attitudes by shedding light to the role of past exposure to shocks as well as its persistent
effect. It is thus interesting to explore how these two experiences (past and present) interact
with each other. Evidence from the recent crisis in Europe and the world suggested that different
countries responded differently even when the shock they faced was similar in magnitude and
nature. We argue that this differential rise of populism has its roots partly to past exposure to
different economic shocks.
To formally test this, we interact our measure of past exposure to economic shocks with the
measure of current exposure. Table 1, in columns 5 and 6 reports the results for the benchmark
specification for voting while Table 5 presents the results when the outcome variable is trust that
an individual shows in national and European institutions i.e, trust in parties, parliament, etc.
and the main explanatory variable is the interaction term between shock and the first principal
component of unemployment, income difficulties and exposure to globalization.
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]
The magnitude and the sign of the coefficients related to past and current exposure to shocks
are in line with the benchmark analysis, i.e., an increase in the growth shock is associated with a
rise in populist voting, lower trust in political institutions and stronger anti-immigrant attitudes.
Interestingly, the interaction term is positive and statistically significant for the cases of trust
in political parties thus suggesting that the negative effect of a current crisis is mitigated the
higher the exposure to past shocks. This implies that past experiences carve the personalities of
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people and make them less vulnerable and less prone to populist attitudes. In a similar fashion,
the higher the past exposure to an economic shock, the less strong the current anti-immigrant
attitudes become, potentially shaped by similar experiences in the past. This experience however
is not reflected in voting patterns.
We believe that this finding is crucial in explaining why similar crisis experience, like the
Great Recession of 2008, gave rise to differential levels of populism, even for countries with similar
macroeconomic characteristics. We argue that it is not only the current economic conditions
that shape political attitudes but their interplay with past experiences, which moderate current
reactions.
6 Conclusion
We establish the interplay between macroeconomic shocks experienced during the impressionable
years and greater demand for populism in Europe. Individuals who grew up in countries hit by
recessions between their 18 and 25 years, tend to not participate in national elections and if so,
they support populist parties . They also trust less the political institutions and manifest stronger
anti-immigrant attitudes. Our analysis accounts for a wide range of individual characteristics
and a demanding list of fixed effects accounting for unobservables. We show that our results are
robust when we use a different age range, i.e., the years 18 to 33, in which the individuals form
their political behavior. Additionally, we restrict our sample to countries that have at least one
populist party. Importantly, accounting for the interaction between the macroeconomic shock
and an overall measure of individual economic insecurity, we find that the interplay between the
two has a moderating effect, suggesting that people who were more exposed to economic shocks
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in the past, are less vulnerable to populist voice in the face of current economic shocks. Our
research sheds light on the role of past economic events on shaping the personality of individuals




Table 1: Macroeconomic Shocks, Participation in Voting (Vote) and Vote Populist Party (Pop-
ulist)
Vote Populist Vote Populist Vote Populist
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Growth Shock (18-25) -.0090 .0712∗ .1548 .0934∗∗
[.0413] [.0366] [.1282] [.0438]
Interaction term -.0408 -.0038
[.0420] [.0219]
Growth Shock (18-33) -.0350 .0843∗
[.0568] [.0450]
Unemployment -.0318∗∗∗ .0107∗∗ -.0300∗∗∗ .0122∗∗ -.0410∗∗∗ .0070
[.0061] [.0047] [.0056] [.0047] [.0100] [.0047]
Income difficulties -.0288∗∗∗ .0132∗∗∗ -.0293∗∗∗ .0145∗∗∗ -.0398∗∗∗ .0120∗∗∗
[.0054] [.0043] [.0054] [.0048] [.0071] [.0035]
Globalization Exposure -.0406∗∗ -.0135 -.0437∗∗ -.0094 -.0258∗∗ .0015
[.0176] [.0092] [.0167] [.0092] [.0124] [.0096]
R-squared 0.13 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.13 0.09
Observations 114437 119246 130900 135880 114437 119246
Notes: The analysis controls for individual characteristics such as gender, political orientation, years of education, risk aversion, hours
per week watching TV and how many of these hours are spent watching programs about politics, unemployment, income difficulties,
global exposure, confidence in political parties and attitudes towards immigrants from no EU countries as well as for age×country, age,
wave and cohort fixed effects. The sample is restricted to the populist ESS countries. Robust standard errors clustered at the country
level are shown in parenthesis. *** significant 1% or less; ** significant at 5% ; * significant at 10% confidence level.
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Table 2: Macroeconomic Shocks During the Impressionable Years (18-25)
Trust Few immigrants Trust Trust Trust Government Few immigrants Many immigrants Immigrants make
Parties no Politicians Parliament EU Satisfaction different same country worse
EU ethnicity ethnicity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Growth Shock (18-25) -1.0131∗∗∗ .1944∗∗∗ -.9511∗∗∗ -1.2728∗∗∗ -.2941∗ -.8609∗∗∗ .1206∗ -.0105 .4571∗∗∗
[.0667] [.0534] [.0891] [.1566] [.1525] [.1124] [.0580] [.0597] [.1218]
Economic Insecurity (PC) -.2963∗∗∗ .0518∗∗∗ -.3199∗∗∗ -.3532∗∗∗ -.2210∗∗∗ -.3753∗∗∗ .0577∗∗∗ -.0479∗∗∗ .1960∗∗∗
[.0059] [.0033] [.0028] [.0096] [.0090] [.0070] [.0026] [.0049] [.0088]
R-squared 0.18 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.08 0.15 0.16 0.12 0.13
Observations 140570 157419 159779 159092 148985 157888 157772 157833 157212
Notes: The analysis controls for individual characteristics such as gender, political orientation, etc., as well as for age×country, age, wave and cohort fixed effects. In regressions
all ESS countries are included. Robust standard errors clustered at the cohort level are shown in parenthesis. *** significant 1% or less; ** significant at 5% ; * significant at
10% confidence level.
17
Table 3: Macroeconomic Shocks During the Years 18-33
Trust Few immigrants Trust Trust Trust Government Few immigrants Many immigrants Immigrants make
Parties no Politicians Parliament EU Satisfaction different same country worse
EU ethnicity ethnicity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Growth Shock (18-33) -1.2397∗∗∗ .3281∗∗∗ -1.1759∗∗∗ -1.3109∗∗∗ -.3750 -1.0438∗∗∗ .2427∗∗∗ -.0439 .7292∗∗∗
[.2473] [.0539] [.2236] [.3326] [.2341] [.2139] [.0489] [.0543] [.1126]
Economic Insecurity (PC) -.3006∗∗∗ .0511∗∗∗ -.3238∗∗∗ -.3568∗∗∗ -.2164∗∗∗ -.3741∗∗∗ .0566∗∗∗ -.0472∗∗∗ .1954∗∗∗
[.0084] [.0031] [.0047] [.0104] [.0102] [.0078] [.0028] [.0041] [.0095]
R-squared 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.08 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.13
Observations 160252 179514 182366 157727 169227 180152 179982 180088 179052
Notes: The analysis controls for individual characteristics such as gender, political orientation, etc., as well as for age×country, age, wave and cohort fixed effects. In regressions
all ESS countries are included. Robust standard errors clustered at the cohort level are shown in parenthesis. *** significant 1% or less; ** significant at 5% ; * significant at
10% confidence level.
18
Table 4: Populist Countries Restricted Sample
Trust Few immigrants Trust Trust Trust Government Few immigrants Many immigrants Immigrants make
Parties no Politicians Parliament EU Satisfaction different same country worse
EU ethnicity ethnicity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Growth Shock (18-25) -.7925∗∗∗ .1943∗ -.7551∗∗∗ -.9299∗∗∗ -.1033 -.7848∗∗∗ .1511 -.0836 .2401
[.0862] [.0886] [.0987] [.1194] [.2497] [.1356] [.1035] [.0692] [.2407]
Economic Insecurity (PC) -.2932∗∗∗ .0548∗∗∗ -.3198∗∗∗ -.3484∗∗∗ -.2215∗∗∗ -.3744∗∗∗ .0626∗∗∗ -.0541∗∗∗ .2018∗∗∗
[.0079] [.0031] [.0055] [.0095] [.0089] [.0069] [.0028] [.0042] [.0095]
R-squared 0.19 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.09 0.15 0.16 0.12 0.14
Observations 121226 136812 138553 137984 130847 136700 137000 136983 136727
Notes: The analysis controls for individual characteristics such as gender, political orientation, etc., as well as for age×country, age, wave and cohort fixed effects. In regressions
all ESS countries are included. Robust standard errors clustered at the cohort level are shown in parenthesis. *** significant 1% or less; ** significant at 5% ; * significant at
10% confidence level.
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Table 5: Interactions: Macroeconomic Shocks and Economic Insecurity
Trust Few immigrants Trust Trust Trust Government Few immigrants Many immigrants Immigrants make
Parties no Politicians Parliament EU Satisfaction different same country worse
EU ethnicity ethnicity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Growth Shock (18-25) -.4838∗∗∗ .1362∗∗∗ -.4925∗∗∗ -.8008∗∗∗ -.2652∗∗ -.4782∗∗ .1249∗∗∗ -.0046 .2631∗∗∗
[.0385] [.0297] [.1143] [.1924] [.0934] [.1888] [.0302] [.0587] [.0724]
Economic Insecurity (PC) -.2625∗∗∗ .0460∗∗∗ -.2916∗∗∗ -.3464∗∗∗ -.2115∗∗∗ -.3476∗∗∗ .0549∗∗∗ -.0476∗∗∗ .2019∗∗∗
[.0053] [.0047] [.0093] [.0079] [.0090] [.0170] [.0036] [.0040] [.0113]
x Shock .1643∗∗ -.0428∗∗ .1849∗∗∗ .2471∗∗∗ .1125 .0624 -.0734∗∗ .1008∗∗∗ -.0595
[.0514] [.0134] [.0477] [.0424] [.0640] [.0382] [.0257] [.0258] [.0597]
R-squared 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.13 0.14
Observations 140570 157419 159779 159092 148985 157888 157772 157833 157212
Notes: The analysis controls for individual characteristics such as gender, political orientation, etc., as well as for age×country, age, wave and cohort fixed effects. In regressions
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A Online Appendix
This section provides an analytical overview of all the variables employed in the analysis.
A.1 ESS Variables
Outcome Variables
Vote in last national elections. “Vote in national elections” corresponds to the question
“Some people don’t vote nowadays for one reason or another. Did you vote in the last [country]
national election in [month/year]?”. It is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if he or she has
voted and 0 otherwise.
Party voted. Individuals of all countries correspond to the question “Which party did you
vote for in that election?”.
Vote for a populist party. It is a dummy variable indicating whether the individuals in
each European country have voted for a populist party or not. 0 means not voting for populist
parties and 1 means voted for it.
Trust in Parties. “Trust in Political Parties” corresponds to the question “Using this card,
please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out.
0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly
[country]’s political parties?”.
Trust in Politicians. “Trust in Politicians” corresponds to the question “Using this card,
please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out.
0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly
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[country]’s politicians?”
Trust in Parliament. “Trust in Parliament” corresponds to the question “Using this card,
please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out.
0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly
[country]’s parliament?”.
Trust in European Union. “Trust in European Parliament” corresponds to the question
“Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the
institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have
complete trust. Firstly the European Parliament?”.
Satisfaction with Government. “Satisfaction with the National Government” corresponds
to the question “How satisfied with the way national government is doing its job?”. The variable
takes values from 0 to 10 with 0 denoting “extremely dissatisfied” and 10 denoting “extremely
satisfied”.
Few immigrants from no EU. Respondents correspond to the question“How about people
from the poorer countries outside Europe?”. 1 means allow many to come and live, and 4 means
allow none.
Few immigrants from different race or ethnicity. Individuals correspond to the question
“How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people?”. 1 means allow
many to come and live, and 4 means allow none.
Few immigrants from same race or ethnicity. Individuals correspond to the question
“Using this card, to what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or
ethnic group as most [country] people to come and live here?”. 1 means allow many to come and
live, and 4 means allow none.
24
Immigrants make country worse. Individuals correspond to the question “Is [country]
made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?”. 0
means worse place to live, and 10 better place to live.
Control Variables
Age. The age of the respondent.
Political Orientation. In politics people sometimes talk of ’left’ and ’right’. Individuals
correspond to the question “Using this card, where would you place yourself on this scale, where
0 means the left and 10 means the right?”.
Gender. The gender of the respondent.
Years of Education. Log years of education denotes the number of years that the individual
has completed full-time or part-time. It is a continuous variable.
Risk Aversion. Individuals respond to the question “Please listen to each description and
tell me how much each person is or is not like you. Use this card for your answer. She/he looks
for adventures and likes to take risks. She/he wants to have an exciting life”. 1 means very much
like that, and 6 not like me at all.
TV watching total time. Individuals correspond to the question “On an average weekday,
how much time, in total, do you spend watching television?”. 0 means no time at all, and 7 more
than three hours.
TV watching politics/news/affairs. Individuals correspond to the question “On an average
weekday,how much of your time watching television is spent watching news or programs about
politics and current affairs”. 0 means no time at all, and 7 more than three hours.
Unemployment. Individuals correspond to the question “Have any of these periods been
within the past 5 years?”. It is a dummy variable taking the values 1 if the answer is positive and
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0 otherwise.
Income difficulties. It is associated with the question “Which of the descriptions on this
card comes closest to how you feel about your household’s income nowadays?”. 0 means “Living
comfortably on present income” and 1 means “Very difficult on present income”.
Globalization exposure. Individuals respond to the question “What is/was the name or
title of your main job? In your main job, what kind of work do/did you do most of the time?
What training or qualifications are/were needed for the job?”. It is a dummy variable taking the
value 1 whether the individual works as a low ski blue collar worker in manufacturing and 0 if not.
A.2 WB (Shock) Variable
GDP per capita growth rate. Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on
constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. GDP per capita is
gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP at purchaser’s prices is the sum of
gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any
subsidies not included in the value of the products.
Growth Shock. It is a dummy variable, taking the value 1 whether the GDP per capita
growth rate is either equal or lower than -3.4% and 0 otherwise.
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B Supplementary Tables and Figures
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B.1 Tables
This section provides an analytical overview of the summary statistics and the tables (baseline
and robustness) used in our analysis, exporting also the beta coefficients.
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics
Impr. Years (18-25)
mean sd min max
Voting participation
Vote in last national elections 1.79 0.40 0 1
Vote for a populist party 1.08 0.27 0 1
Political beliefs
Trust in politicians 3.43 2.38 0 10
Trust in parliament 4.30 2.59 0 10
Trust in EU parliament 4.33 2.47 0 10
Trust in political parties 3.38 2.36 0 10
Satisfaction with national government 4.11 2.46 0 10
Attitudes towards immigrants
Immigrants make host country worse 5.28 2.30 0 10
Allow few immigrants outside EU 2.61 0.91 1 4
Allow few immigrants from different race or ethnicity 2.53 0.90 1 4
Allow many immigrants from same race or ethnicity 2.78 0.89 1 4
Economic Sentiment
Growth Shock 0.04 0.13 0 1
Number of Shocks 0.25 0.75 0 7
Unemployment 1.27 0.44 0 1
Income difficulties 1.98 0.85 0 1
Globalization exposure 1.01 0.10 0 1
Principal Component (PCA) 0.23 0.78 -0.49 2.08
Demographics
Men 0.46 0.49 0 1
Years of education 12.31 4.07 0 56
Risk aversion 3.95 1.43 1 6
Political orientation 5.14 2.22 0 10
TV hours watching TV 5.30 2.05 0 7
TV hours watching politics 2.99 1.32 0 7
Notes - Sources: European Social Survey ESS (2002-2016). The table reports participation in voting, vote for populist parties, trust
in political institutions, satisfaction from national government, attitudes towards immigrants, individual demographic and country
economic sentiment descriptive statistics.
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Table 7: Macroeconomic Shocks During the Impressionable Years (18-25)
Vote Populist Trust Few immigrants Trust Trust Trust Government Few immigrants Many immigrants Immigrants make
Parties no politicians Parliament EU Satisfaction different same country worse
EU ethnicity ethnicity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Growth Shock (18-25) -.0090 .0712∗ -1.0131∗∗∗ .1944∗∗∗ -.9511∗∗∗ -1.2728∗∗∗ -.2941∗ -.8609∗∗∗ .1206∗ -.0105 .4571∗∗∗
[.0413] [.0366] [.0667] [.0534] [.0891] [.1566] [.1525] [.1124] [.0580] [.0597] [.1218]
Risk Aversion .0068∗∗∗ .0004 -.0102 .0054∗∗ .0008 .0260∗∗ -.0258∗∗ .0091 .0074∗∗∗ .0048∗∗ .0336∗∗∗
[.0017] [.0015] [.0092] [.0021] [.0082] [.0092] [.0091] [.0072] [.0021] [.0018] [.0081]
ln(Education) .0973∗∗∗ -.0164 .3899∗∗∗ -.3896∗∗∗ .4504∗∗∗ .7146∗∗∗ .5022∗∗∗ .1690∗∗∗ -.4409∗∗∗ .4349∗∗∗ -1.0605∗∗∗
[.0213] [.0107] [.0411] [.0267] [.0417] [.0638] [.0408] [.0363] [.0263] [.0219] [.0697]
TV total -.0103∗∗∗ .0032∗ -.0466∗∗∗ .0469∗∗∗ -.0502∗∗∗ -.0763∗∗∗ -.0473∗∗∗ -.0328∗∗∗ .0449∗∗∗ -.0347∗∗∗ .0970∗∗∗
[.0021] [.0015] [.0031] [.0017] [.0028] [.0024] [.0050] [.0035] [.0017] [.0018] [.0046]
TV politics .0184∗∗∗ .0043∗∗∗ .1221∗∗∗ -.0450∗∗∗ .1158∗∗∗ .1147∗∗∗ .0857∗∗∗ .0481∗∗∗ -.0502∗∗∗ .0406∗∗∗ -.1282∗∗∗
[.0030] [.0013] [.0083] [.0028] [.0092] [.0131] [.0091] [.0062] [.0038] [.0029] [.0092]
Unemployment -.0318∗∗∗ .0107∗∗
[.0061] [.0047]
Income difficulties -.0288∗∗∗ .0132∗∗∗
[.0054] [.0043]
Globalization Exposure -.0406∗∗ -.0135
[.0176] [.0092]
Economic Insecurity (PC) -.2963∗∗∗ .0518∗∗∗ -.3199∗∗∗ -.3532∗∗∗ -.2210∗∗∗ -.3753∗∗∗ .0577∗∗∗ -.0479∗∗∗ .1960∗∗∗
[.0059] [.0033] [.0028] [.0096] [.0090] [.0070] [.0026] [.0049] [.0088]
R-squared .13 .08 .18 .15 .17 .17 .08 .15 .16 .12 .13
Observations 114437 119246 140570 157419 159779 159092 148985 157888 157772 157833 157212
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age*Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster SE Country Country Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort
Countries With P With P All All All All All All All All All
Notes: The table reports the coefficients associated with regressions of exposure to macroeconomic shocks during the impressionable
years (18-25) in participation in voting, vote for populist parties, trust in several institutions and attitudes towards immigrants. As
additional controls, individual characteristics such as gender, political orientation, logged years of education, risk aversion, hours per
week watching TV and programs about politics, current economic insecurity like unemployment, income difficulties, global exposure,
their first principal component and as well as for age×country, age, wave and cohort fixed effects are used. Robust standard errors
clustered at the country and cohorts level are shown in parenthesis. *** significant 1% or less; ** significant at 5% ; * significant at
10% confidence level.
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Table 8: Macroeconomic Shocks During Years 18-33
Vote Populist Trust Few immigrants Trust Trust Trust Government Few immigrants Many immigrants Immigrants make
Parties no politicians Parliament EU Satisfaction different same country worse
EU ethnicity ethnicity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Growth Shock (18-33) -.0350 .0843∗ -1.2397∗∗∗ .3281∗∗∗ -1.1759∗∗∗ -1.3109∗∗∗ -.3750 -1.0438∗∗∗ .2427∗∗∗ -.0439 .7292∗∗∗
[.0568] [.0450] [.2473] [.0539] [.2236] [.3326] [.2341] [.2139] [.0489] [.0543] [.1126]
Risk Aversion .0061∗∗∗ .0003 -.0145 .0066∗∗ -.0036 .0255∗∗ -.0292∗∗∗ .0035 .0082∗∗∗ .0047∗∗ .0360∗∗∗
[.0016] [.0016] [.0093] [.0023] [.0084] [.0085] [.0085] [.0080] [.0019] [.0015] [.0078]
ln(Education) .0920∗∗∗ -.0097 .3660∗∗∗ -.3727∗∗∗ .4221∗∗∗ .7919∗∗∗ .4575∗∗∗ .1794∗∗∗ -.4263∗∗∗ .4271∗∗∗ -1.0108∗∗∗
[.0199] [.0118] [.0356] [.0303] [.0402] [.0727] [.0495] [.0372] [.0300] [.0236] [.0769]
TV total -.0100∗∗∗ .0028∗ -.0405∗∗∗ .0469∗∗∗ -.0454∗∗∗ -.0824∗∗∗ -.0395∗∗∗ -.0289∗∗∗ .0444∗∗∗ -.0353∗∗∗ .0950∗∗∗
[.0019] [.0016] [.0037] [.0016] [.0030] [.0042] [.0053] [.0028] [.0012] [.0017] [.0036]
TV politics .0181∗∗∗ .0045∗∗∗ .1161∗∗∗ -.0441∗∗∗ .1104∗∗∗ .1188∗∗∗ .0834∗∗∗ .0433∗∗∗ -.0490∗∗∗ .0413∗∗∗ -.1232∗∗∗
[.0028] [.0013] [.0084] [.0024] [.0082] [.0154] [.0087] [.0062] [.0028] [.0025] [.0078]
Unemployment -.0300∗∗∗ .0122∗∗
[.0056] [.0047]
Income difficulties -.0293∗∗∗ .0145∗∗∗
[.0054] [.0048]
Globalization Exposure -.0437∗∗ -.0094
[.0167] [.0092]
Economic Insecurity (PC) -.3006∗∗∗ .0511∗∗∗ -.3238∗∗∗ -.3568∗∗∗ -.2164∗∗∗ -.3741∗∗∗ .0566∗∗∗ -.0472∗∗∗ .1954∗∗∗
[.0084] [.0031] [.0047] [.0104] [.0102] [.0078] [.0028] [.0041] [.0095]
R-squared 0.12 0.08 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.08 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.13
Observations 130900 135880 160252 179514 182366 157727 169227 180152 179982 180088 179052
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age*Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster SE Country Country Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort
Countries With P With P All All All All All All All All All
Notes: The table reports the coefficients associated with regressions of exposure to macroeconomic shocks during the years 18-33 in
participation in voting, vote for populist parties, trust in several institutions and attitudes towards immigrants. As additional controls,
individual characteristics such as gender, political orientation, logged years of education, risk aversion, hours per week watching TV
and programs about politics, current economic insecurity like unemployment, income difficulties, global exposure, their first principal
component and as well as for age×country, age, wave and cohort fixed effects are used. Robust standard errors clustered at the country
and cohorts level are shown in parenthesis. *** significant 1% or less; ** significant at 5% ; * significant at 10% confidence level.
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Table 9: Populist Countries Restricted Sample
Trust Few immigrants Trust Trust Trust Government Few immigrants Many immigrants Immigrants make
Parties no politicians Parliament EU Satisfaction different same country worse
EU ethnicity ethnicity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Growth Shock (18-25) -.7925∗∗∗ .1943∗ -.7551∗∗∗ -.9299∗∗∗ -.1033 -.7848∗∗∗ .1511 -.0836 .2401
[.0862] [.0886] [.0987] [.1194] [.2497] [.1356] [.1035] [.0692] [.2407]
Risk Aversion -.0030 .0060∗∗ .0090 .0304∗∗∗ -.0232∗∗ .0115 .0075∗∗ .0010 .0405∗∗∗
[.0096] [.0019] [.0071] [.0075] [.0075] [.0080] [.0026] [.0018] [.0070]
ln(Education) .4157∗∗∗ -.4159∗∗∗ .4954∗∗∗ .8552∗∗∗ .6432∗∗∗ .2031∗∗∗ -.4696∗∗∗ .4363∗∗∗ -1.1678∗∗∗
[.0370] [.0262] [.0413] [.0615] [.0385] [.0265] [.0280] [.0223] [.0751]
TV total -.0594∗∗∗ .0470∗∗∗ -.0633∗∗∗ -.0885∗∗∗ -.0501∗∗∗ -.0429∗∗∗ .0451∗∗∗ -.0386∗∗∗ .1001∗∗∗
[.0040] [.0018] [.0028] [.0039] [.0048] [.0028] [.0015] [.0017] [.0045]
TV politics .1395∗∗∗ -.0469∗∗∗ .1295∗∗∗ .1260∗∗∗ .0887∗∗∗ .0522∗∗∗ -.0532∗∗∗ .0470∗∗∗ -.1359∗∗∗
[.0124] [.0030] [.0120] [.0161] [.0101] [.0072] [.0039] [.0023] [.0104]
Economic Insecurity (PC) -.2932∗∗∗ .0548∗∗∗ -.3198∗∗∗ -.3484∗∗∗ -.2215∗∗∗ -.3744∗∗∗ .0626∗∗∗ -.0541∗∗∗ .2018∗∗∗
[.0079] [.0031] [.0055] [.0095] [.0089] [.0069] [.0028] [.0042] [.0095]
R-squared 0.19 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.09 0.15 0.16 0.12 0.14
Observations 121226 136812 138553 137984 130847 136700 137000 136983 136727
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age*Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster SE Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort
Countries With P With P With P With P With P With P With P With P With P
Notes: The table reports the coefficients associated with regressions of exposure to macroeconomic shocks during the impressionable
years (18-25) in participation in voting, vote for populist parties, trust in several institutions and attitudes towards immigrants. As
additional controls, individual characteristics such as gender, political orientation, logged years of education, risk aversion, hours per
week watching TV and programs about politics, the first principal component of current economic insecurity like unemployment, income
difficulties, global exposure and as well as for age×country, age, wave and cohort fixed effects are used. The sample now is restricted
to ESS populist countries. Robust standard errors clustered at the cohorts level are shown in parenthesis. *** significant 1% or less;
** significant at 5% ; * significant at 10% confidence level.
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Table 10: Interactions: Macroeconomic Shocks and Economic Insecurity
Vote Populist Trust Few immigrants Trust Trust Trust Government Few immigrants Many immigrants Immigrants make
Parties no politicians Parliament EU Satisfaction different same country worse
EU ethnicity ethnicity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Growth Shock (18-25) .1548 .0934∗∗ -.4838∗∗∗ .1362∗∗∗ -.4925∗∗∗ -.8008∗∗∗ -.2652∗∗ -.4782∗∗ .1249∗∗∗ -.0046 .2631∗∗∗
[.1282] [.0438] [.0385] [.0297] [.1143] [.1924] [.0934] [.1888] [.0302] [.0587] [.0724]
Income Difficulties -.0398∗∗∗ .0120∗∗∗
[.0071] [.0035]
x Shock -.0408 -.0038
[.0420] [.0219]
Economic Insecurity (PC) -.2625∗∗∗ .0460∗∗∗ -.2916∗∗∗ -.3464∗∗∗ -.2115∗∗∗ -.3476∗∗∗ .0549∗∗∗ -.0476∗∗∗ .2019∗∗∗
[.0053] [.0047] [.0093] [.0079] [.0090] [.0170] [.0036] [.0040] [.0113]
x Shock .1643∗∗ -.0428∗∗ .1849∗∗∗ .2471∗∗∗ .1125 .0624 -.0734∗∗ .1008∗∗∗ -.0595
[.0514] [.0134] [.0477] [.0424] [.0640] [.0382] [.0257] [.0258] [.0597]
Risk Aversion .0094∗∗ .0005 -.0018 .0057∗ .0079 .0293∗ -.0146 .0231 .0067∗ .0060 .0211
[.0036] [.0015] [.0149] [.0029] [.0139] [.0133] [.0126] [.0131] [.0032] [.0032] [.0123]
ln(Education) .1076∗∗∗ -.0037 .3033∗∗∗ -.3980∗∗∗ .3609∗∗∗ .6049∗∗∗ .4540∗∗∗ .1150∗∗ -.4453∗∗∗ .4371∗∗∗ -1.0686∗∗∗
[.0309] [.0082] [.0405] [.0285] [.0483] [.0809] [.0488] [.0370] [.0242] [.0198] [.0748]
TV total -.0158∗∗∗ .0013 -.0319∗∗∗ .0462∗∗∗ -.0398∗∗∗ -.0634∗∗∗ -.0573∗∗∗ -.0094 .0451∗∗∗ -.0374∗∗∗ .0918∗∗∗
[.0027] [.0014] [.0053] [.0028] [.0064] [.0067] [.0072] [.0058] [.0030] [.0011] [.0079]
TV politics .0206∗∗∗ .0038∗ .1067∗∗∗ -.0393∗∗∗ .1012∗∗∗ .1143∗∗∗ .0845∗∗∗ .0482∗∗∗ -.0453∗∗∗ .0334∗∗∗ -.1160∗∗∗
[.0037] [.0020] [.0072] [.0052] [.0091] [.0089] [.0056] [.0062] [.0059] [.0048] [.0053]
Unemployment -.0410∗∗∗ .0070
[.0100] [.0047]
Globalization Exposure -.0258∗∗ .0015
[.0124] [.0096]
R-squared 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.13 0.14
Observations 114437 119246 140570 157419 159779 159092 148985 157888 157772 157833 157212
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age*Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster SE Country Country Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort
Countries With P With P All All All All All All All All All
Notes: The table reports the coefficients associated with regressions of exposure to macroeconomic shocks during the impressionable
years (18-25), the interaction between past shocks and current economic insecurity expressed by income difficulties and the first principal
component of unemployment, income difficulties and global exposure in participation in voting, vote for populist parties, trust in several
institutions and attitudes towards immigrants. As additional controls, individual characteristics such as gender, political orientation,
logged years of education, risk aversion, hours per week watching TV and programs about politics and as well as for age×country, age,
wave and cohort fixed effects are used. Robust standard errors clustered at the country and cohorts level are shown in parenthesis. ***
significant 1% or less; ** significant at 5% ; * significant at 10% confidence level.
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Table 11: Beta Coefficients: Macroeconomic Shocks During the Impressionable Years (18-25)
Vote Populist Trust Few immigrants Trust Trust Trust Government Few immigrants Many immigrants Immigrants make
Parties no politicians Parliament EU Satisfaction different same country worse
EU ethnicity ethnicity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Growth Shock (18-25) -.002 .026∗ -.056∗∗∗ .027∗∗∗ -.050∗∗∗ -.063∗∗∗ -.015∗ -.044∗∗∗ .017∗ -.002 .025∗∗∗
[.0413] [.0366] [.0667] [.0534] [.0891] [.1566] [.1525] [.1124] [.0580] [.0597] [.1218]
Risk Aversion .024∗∗∗ .002 -.006 .009∗∗ .000 .015∗∗ -.015∗∗ .005 .012∗∗∗ .008∗∗ .021∗∗∗
[.0017] [.0015] [.0092] [.0021] [.0082] [.0092] [.0091] [.0072] [.0021] [.0018] [.0081]
ln(Education) .080∗∗∗ -.018 .061∗∗∗ -.156∗∗∗ .069∗∗∗ .102∗∗∗ .075∗∗∗ .025∗∗∗ -.181∗∗∗ .183∗∗∗ -.168∗∗∗
[.0213] [.0107] [.0411] [.0267] [.0417] [.0638] [.0408] [.0363] [.0263] [.0219] [.0697]
TV total -.050∗∗∗ .021∗ -.038∗∗∗ .099∗∗∗ -.041∗∗∗ -.057∗∗∗ -.038∗∗∗ -.026∗∗∗ .097∗∗∗ -.077∗∗∗ .081∗∗∗
[.0021] [.0015] [.0031] [.0017] [.0028] [.0024] [.0050] [.0035] [.0017] [.0018] [.0046]
TV politics .058∗∗∗ .018∗∗∗ .066∗∗∗ -.063∗∗∗ .062∗∗∗ .057∗∗∗ .045∗∗∗ .025∗∗∗ -.072∗∗∗ .059∗∗∗ -.071∗∗∗
[.0030] [.0013] [.0083] [.0028] [.0092] [.0131] [.0091] [.0062] [.0038] [.0029] [.0092]
Unemployment -.038∗∗∗ .017∗∗
[.0061] [.0047]
Income difficulties -.061∗∗∗ .038∗∗∗
[.0054] [.0043]
Globalization Exposure -.010∗∗ -.004
[.0176] [.0092]
Economic Insecurity (PC) -.140∗∗∗ .063∗∗∗ -.150∗∗∗ -.153∗∗∗ -.101∗∗∗ -.170∗∗∗ .072∗∗∗ -.062∗∗∗ .095∗∗∗
[.0059] [.0033] [.0028] [.0096] [.0090] [.0070] [.0026] [.0049] [.0088]
R-squared 0.13 0.08 0.18 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.08 0.15 0.16 0.12 0.13
Observations 114437 119246 140570 157419 159779 159092 148985 157888 157772 157833 157212
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age*Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster SE Country Country Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort
Countries With P With P All All All All All All All All All
Notes: Beta coefficients correspond to the baseline specification of impressionable years hypothesis.
Table 12: Beta Coefficients: Macroeconomic Shocks During the Years 18-33
Vote Populist Trust Few immigrants Trust Trust Trust Government Few immigrants Many immigrants Immigrants make
Parties no politicians Parliament EU Satisfaction different same country worse
EU ethnicity ethnicity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Growth Shock (18-33) -.009 .029∗ -.066∗∗∗ .044∗∗∗ -.060∗∗∗ -.052∗∗∗ -.018 -.052∗∗∗ .033∗∗∗ -.006 .038∗∗∗
[.0568] [.0450] [.2473] [.0539] [.2236] [.3326] [.2341] [.2139] [.0489] [.0543] [.1126]
Risk Aversion .022∗∗∗ .001 -.009 .010∗∗ -.002 .014∗∗ -.017∗∗∗ .002 .013∗∗∗ .008∗∗ .023∗∗∗
[.0016] [.0016] [.0093] [.0023] [.0084] [.0085] [.0085] [.0080] [.0019] [.0015] [.0078]
ln(Education) .079∗∗∗ -.011 .058∗∗∗ -.154∗∗∗ .067∗∗∗ .105∗∗∗ .070∗∗∗ .027∗∗∗ -.180∗∗∗ .185∗∗∗ -.166∗∗∗
[.0199] [.0118] [.0356] [.0303] [.0402] [.0727] [.0495] [.0372] [.0300] [.0236] [.0769]
TV total -.049∗∗∗ .018∗ -.033∗∗∗ .099∗∗∗ -.037∗∗∗ -.063∗∗∗ -.031∗∗∗ -.023∗∗∗ .096∗∗∗ -.078∗∗∗ .080∗∗∗
[.0019] [.0016] [.0037] [.0016] [.0030] [.0042] [.0053] [.0028] [.0012] [.0017] [.0036]
TV politics .059∗∗∗ .019∗∗∗ .064∗∗∗ -.063∗∗∗ .060∗∗∗ .060∗∗∗ .044∗∗∗ .023∗∗∗ -.071∗∗∗ .061∗∗∗ -.070∗∗∗
[.0028] [.0013] [.0084] [.0024] [.0082] [.0154] [.0087] [.0062] [.0028] [.0025] [.0078]
Unemployment -.036∗∗∗ .019∗∗
[.0056] [.0047]
Income difficulties -.063∗∗∗ .041∗∗∗
[.0054] [.0048]
Globalization Exposure -.011∗∗ -.003
[.0167] [.0092]
Economic Insecurity (PC) -.142∗∗∗ .062∗∗∗ -.151∗∗∗ -.157∗∗∗ -.099∗∗∗ -.169∗∗∗ .071∗∗∗ -.060∗∗∗ .095∗∗∗
[.0084] [.0031] [.0047] [.0104] [.0102] [.0078] [.0028] [.0041] [.0095]
R-squared .12 .08 .17 .15 .17 .18 .08 .15 .15 .12 .13
Observations 130900 135880 160252 179514 182366 157727 169227 180152 179982 180088 179052
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age*Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster SE Country Country Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort
Countries With P With P All All All All All All All All All
Notes: Beta coefficients correspond to the specification of years 18 to 33.
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Table 13: Beta Coefficients: Populist Countries Restricted Sample
Trust Few immigrants Trust Trust Trust Government Few immigrants Many immigrants Immigrants make
Parties no politicians Parliament EU Satisfaction different same country worse
EU ethnicity ethnicity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Growth Shock (18-25) -.037∗∗∗ .023∗ -.034∗∗∗ -.039∗∗∗ -.005 -.035∗∗∗ .018 -.011 .011
[.0862] [.0886] [.0987] [.1194] [.2497] [.1356] [.1035] [.0692] [.2407]
Risk Aversion -.002 .010∗∗ .005 .017∗∗∗ -.014∗∗ .007 .012∗∗ .002 .025∗∗∗
[.0096] [.0019] [.0071] [.0075] [.0075] [.0080] [.0026] [.0018] [.0070]
ln(Education) .058∗∗∗ -.150∗∗∗ .068∗∗∗ .109∗∗∗ .087∗∗∗ .027∗∗∗ -.174∗∗∗ .169∗∗∗ -.167∗∗∗
[.0370] [.0262] [.0413] [.0615] [.0385] [.0265] [.0280] [.0223] [.0751]
TV total -.049∗∗∗ .101∗∗∗ -.052∗∗∗ -.068∗∗∗ -.041∗∗∗ -.034∗∗∗ .100∗∗∗ -.089∗∗∗ .085∗∗∗
[.0040] [.0018] [.0028] [.0039] [.0048] [.0028] [.0015] [.0017] [.0045]
TV politics .074∗∗∗ -.065∗∗∗ .068∗∗∗ .062∗∗∗ .046∗∗∗ .027∗∗∗ -.076∗∗∗ .070∗∗∗ -.074∗∗∗
[.0124] [.0030] [.0120] [.0161] [.0101] [.0072] [.0039] [.0023] [.0104]
Economic Insecurity (PC) -.140∗∗∗ .068∗∗∗ -.151∗∗∗ -.153∗∗∗ -.103∗∗∗ -.172∗∗∗ .080∗∗∗ -.072∗∗∗ .099∗∗∗
[.0079] [.0031] [.0055] [.0095] [.0089] [.0069] [.0028] [.0042] [.0095]
R-squared 0.19 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.09 0.15 0.16 0.12 0.14
Observations 121226 136812 138553 137984 130847 136700 137000 136983 136727
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age*Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster SE Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort
Countries With P With P With P With P With P With P With P With P With P
Notes: Beta coefficients correspond to the baseline specification, restricting the sample to populist countries.
Table 14: Beta Coefficients: Interactions between Macroeconomic Shocks and Economic Insecu-
rity
Vote Populist Trust Few immigrants Trust Trust Trust Government Few immigrants Many immigrants Immigrants make
Parties no politicians Parliament EU Satisfaction different same country worse
EU ethnicity ethnicity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Growth Shock (18-25) .032 .032∗∗ -.037∗∗∗ .024∗∗∗ -.036∗∗∗ -.053∗∗∗ -.017∗∗ -.033∗∗ .023∗∗∗ -.001 .019∗∗∗
[.1282] [.0438] [.0385] [.0297] [.1143] [.1924] [.0934] [.1888] [.0302] [.0587] [.0724]
Income Difficulties -.077∗∗∗ .037∗∗∗
[.0071] [.0035]
x Shock -.009 -.001
[.0420] [.0219]
Economic Insecurity (PC) -.128∗∗∗ .055∗∗∗ -.140∗∗∗ -.151∗∗∗ -.095∗∗∗ -.159∗∗∗ .068∗∗∗ -.061∗∗∗ .096∗∗∗
[.0053] [.0047] [.0093] [.0079] [.0090] [.0170] [.0036] [.0040] [.0113]
x Shock .016∗∗ -.010∗∗ .017∗∗∗ .021∗∗∗ .009 .005 -.018∗∗ .025∗∗∗ -.005
[.0514] [.0134] [.0477] [.0424] [.0640] [.0382] [.0257] [.0258] [.0597]
Risk Aversion .033∗∗ .003 -.001 .009∗ .005 .017∗ -.009 .014 .011∗ .010 .013
[.0036] [.0015] [.0149] [.0029] [.0139] [.0133] [.0126] [.0131] [.0032] [.0032] [.0123]
ln(Education) .087∗∗∗ -.005 .048∗∗∗ -.154∗∗∗ .056∗∗∗ .085∗∗∗ .066∗∗∗ .017∗∗ -.178∗∗∗ .179∗∗∗ -.163∗∗∗
[.0309] [.0082] [.0405] [.0285] [.0483] [.0809] [.0488] [.0370] [.0242] [.0198] [.0748]
TV total -.074∗∗∗ .009 -.027∗∗∗ .097∗∗∗ -.033∗∗∗ -.048∗∗∗ -.045∗∗∗ -.007 .097∗∗∗ -.082∗∗∗ .076∗∗∗
[.0027] [.0014] [.0053] [.0028] [.0064] [.0067] [.0072] [.0058] [.0030] [.0011] [.0079]
TV politics .064∗∗∗ .019∗ .061∗∗∗ -.055∗∗∗ .057∗∗∗ .058∗∗∗ .044∗∗∗ .026∗∗∗ -.065∗∗∗ .049∗∗∗ -.064∗∗∗
[.0037] [.0020] [.0072] [.0052] [.0091] [.0089] [.0056] [.0062] [.0059] [.0048] [.0053]
Unemployment -.048∗∗∗ .013
[.0100] [.0047]
Globalization Exposure -.006∗∗ .001
[.0124] [.0096]
R-squared 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.13 0.14
Observations 114437 119246 140570 157419 159779 159092 148985 157888 157772 157833 157212
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age*Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster SE Country Country Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort
Countries With P With P All All All All All All All All All




Figure 1: Shares of populist and parties votes in Europe
Figure 2: Vote shares of populist, far-right and far-left parties by country
Source: Rooduijn et al. (2019)
